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Abstract. This article reviews how the international environment shapes international patent law and
practice with bearing on biomedical innovation. The cluster of issues is encapsulated in two core
paradoxes. The ﬁrst concerns how public goods, such as new pharmaceuticals, may be produced through
the deliberate creation of private rights that exclude material from the public domain. The second
paradox concerns how “technological neutrality” and overall policy balance in the application of general
patent law principles requires technology-speciﬁc interventions by regulators. The article illustrates how
centrifugal and centripetal trends inﬂuence diverse national approaches to applying patentability criteria
for pharmaceutical products.
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LOCATING THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
IN LIFE SCIENCES PATENTING
Pathogens show scant respect for national boundaries,
human physiology is not shaped by national allegiance, and
the ﬂow of medical science is not neatly conﬁned to discrete
jurisdictions. The struggle to combat human disease and to
promote health is inherently international in character and is
recognized as an element of maintaining international peace
and security.
The drafters of the Constitution of the World Health
Organization (WHO), which was adopted in 1946 and
entered into force on 7 April 1948, enshrined principles that
they saw as “basic to the happiness, harmonious relations,
and security of all peoples.” These principles included the
tenets that “[t]he health of all peoples is fundamental to
the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon
the fullest co-operation of individuals and States. The
achievement of any State in the promotion and protection
of health is of value to all. Unequal development in different
countries in the promotion of health and control of disease,
especially communicable disease, is a common danger.” Thus,
the healthcare policymaker is inevitably and naturally drawn
to work with an international, indeed global, perspective,
especially concerning communicable diseases.
By contrast, the law, policy, and practice of patents are,
by and large, conﬁned to national jurisdictions, and they can
differ signiﬁcantly in different countries. The ultimate scope
and reach of patent law are ultimately determined by national
statutes, not international mechanisms (apart from a handful
of regional systems such as the European Patent Ofﬁce (the
EPO; as established by the European Patent Convention)).
Certainly, no “worldwide patent” exists, and there is no
realistic prospect of a true global patent right in any
reasonable time frame: a 2002 World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) study (“WIPO Patent Agenda:
Options for Development of the International Patent Sys-
tem,” document A/37/6, August 19, 2002) noted that “few
people see even a basic system of international grant as a
realistic goal in the short term”.
Patents are “territorial” in that the rights they provided
under a patent have effect only in the national legal
jurisdiction where it is granted. In other words, the granting
of a patent in one country does not constrain activity in
another country. A patent in one country is also legally
“independent” from a patent on the same invention in
another country. This means that a ﬁnding that a patent is
valid or invalid in one jurisdiction does not determine its legal
status elsewhere—so a patent allowed in one country may be
rejected in another country and vice versa. This independence
is a basic tenet of the foundational international treaty
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governing patents, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property. Thus, if the inventor does not separately
obtain a patent in that other country, the invention may fall
fully into the public domain.
Patents remain rooted in the soil of the jurisdiction
where they are granted and do not transcend its borders.
Even so, there is a coherent international dimension to patent
law, policy, administration and practice. Therefore it does
make sense to speak of an “international patent system,”
even when there is no international patent. Yet, many
intellectual property (IP) policymakers, preeminently those
concentrating on life sciences innovation and the pharmaceu-
tical sciences, argue ﬁrmly for the maintenance of national
“policy space” and “ﬂexibility” in the international standards.
They prefer to sustain a high degree of residual legal and
policy autonomy, of heterogeneity, in the patent system (1) in
contrast to the inherently international character of chal-
lenges to public health, the formulation of health policy, and
the conduct of biomedical research.
Notwithstanding the drive for national autonomy in IP law
and practice, the administrative burdens and strong expect-
ations of policymakers mean that some forms of international
harmonization will be essential to promote the effective
development and dissemination of new medical technologies.
Today, a coordinated effort in patent policymaking is integral
to our ability to respond to the evolving global health crises.
The need for some international coherence and coordination is
not a new phenomenon: international cooperation and coordi-
nation on patent matters date back to 1883 with the
establishment of the foundational multilateral treaty, the Paris
Convention, which was elaborated over many years and
remains central to IP law and practice today.
Addressing the systemic challenges of IP policy, which
are substantial and of critical importance, arguably requires
an international approach, now more than ever, even while
pressure remains strong for regulatory diversity and a
differential approach depending on national economic and
social conditions. If the patent system is to be effective in
promoting the development and dissemination of new
medical technologies, especially pharmaceuticals, its sound
operation and the effective functioning of patents as a public
policy instrument is unlikely to be achieved by national
systems operating in isolation from one another.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION
The emergence and continuing evolution of an interna-
tional patent system are not inevitable, despite the long-
established international dimension of patent law and the
pattern of international cooperation and convergence that
have occurred over the past 120 years.
Forces impacting the international patent system can be
described as being either centripetal (encouraging legal and
administrative convergence) or centrifugal (reasserting the
need for national regulatory autonomy and distinctiveness).
Centripetal forces include established policy rationales for
common standards, for regulatory convergence, for legislative
coherence, and for administrative cooperation to enable
pooling of resources for gains in efﬁciency and quality of
regulatory processes. Centrifugal inﬂuences include objective
differences in national infrastructure and economic and
technological development, in differing national priorities
and economic and social challenges, and calls for regulatory
diversity and policy ﬂexibility. As innovation and technology
diffusion models are increasingly transjurisdictional, incon-
sistencies in national policy and practice are argued to be an
injurious constraint on the development and transfer of new
technologies in the health domain. However, as convergence
takes effect, remaining areas of divergence rise in prominence
and critics of existing levels of convergence emphasize that
“one size doesn’t ﬁt all.”
The increasing globalization of the patent system also
shows profound changes to geographical patterns of activity.
Until very recently, almost all patenting activity was sourced
from three major jurisdictions: the USA, the countries within
the European patent system (which largely coincide with, but
are not coextensive with, the members of the European
Union (EU)), and Japan. Recent patenting activity, however,
shows a steep rise in domestic patenting activity in China,
India, the Republic of Korea, and in several other developing
countries. This trend is disproportionately high in the life
sciences. The emergence of these economies as major players
is likely to be the single greatest inﬂuence on the interna-
tional patent system over the next few decades.
A review of the international patent system in 2007 reveals
seemingly contradictory trends. The system is used far more
extensively than was imagined a decade ago, measured either as
a crude count of applications ﬁled, in terms of growing diversity
across jurisdictions (including across perceived “north–south”
divides), across ﬁelds of technology, and across active users of
the system (including both private and public sectors). The
patent system yields “private” rights (2), in the sense that they
are typically recognized as items of private property. However,
this does not imply private ownership. Current innovation
policies in many countries promote the use of such private
rights by the public sector and public interest entities. This is
leading to the steady accumulation of publicly held patent
portfolios and the emergence of a distinct discipline of public
interest IP management (the deployment of private rights
directly to serve public policy objectives). An exemplar of this
approach has been the formulation of public/private partner-
ships as tailored mechanisms for the development of new
treatments for neglected diseases. These partnerships may
develop and aggressively exploit patent estates for explicit
public health outcomes rather than for commercial goals (3).
More generally, the broader social responsibilities of public
sector and not-for-proﬁt patent holders have put the issue of
humanitarian licensing and other forms of public interest IP
management on the agenda (4).
The international system is also making publicly avail-
able an exponentially increasing amount of information about
new technology in a uniform and accessible format. This
public disclosure is, in principle, empirically based and
focused on the practical teaching of how to implement
claimed inventions. It disseminates information that might
otherwise remain largely undisclosed and potentially legally
constrained by conﬁdentiality. The Patent Cooperation Trea-
ty (PCT), a key element of the international patent architec-
ture, provides an international application route to facilitate
the acquisition of national and regional patents. Its legal
operation and practical administration yield a steadily grow-
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ing body of technological knowledge. It also stands in contrast
to some national patent information systems which are, in
principle, accessible to the public but still difﬁcult in practice
to access or use in many countries. The PCT system also
produces extensive metadata of freely usable public domain
information about technology, patterns of technological
activity and ownership, directions in technological develop-
ment, activities of individual inventors and ﬁrms, and
preliminary assessments of the validity of claims (5).
The very existence of an international patent system
promoted and entrenched a near-universal policy of early
publication of patent applications. It also helped to promote open
access and free-of-charge policies. As a consequence, affordable,
accessible information technology delivers this material to users
across the world who, only a few years ago, could not afford it and
had no technological capacity to access and analyze it.
The international patent system is promoting the transpar-
ent socially beneﬁcial dissemination of technology. Neverthe-
less, it is currently facing both an internal challenge concerning
its operating efﬁciency and an external challenge concerning the
legitimacy of its policy role. The sheer pressure of the growing
volume of applications and new technologies strain the ability of
national ofﬁces to sustain patent quality (i.e., the degree to
which patents as actually granted correspond to the public
interest as enshrined in the principles of patent law). Commen-
tators and policymakers are also voicing concern about the
directions taken by patent law and its social and economic
impact. This concern arises at the level of principle: is the patent
system inherently a legitimate policy tool for public health
innovation and, at the level of functionality, is the system
capable of ensuring patent quality?
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS;
6) has been the most potent and direct inﬂuence towards
internationalization of the patent system. The implementation
of TRIPS obligations has induced considerable convergence of
national legal standards in patent law in many developing
countries. By explicit design of its negotiators, it had speciﬁc
impact in the area of pharmaceutical patents and on the
protection of clinical trial data submitted for regulatory
approval of new drugs. A major impetus towards including IP
law within the trade law system had been the need expressed
by the major developed economies for higher and more
consistent standards of IP protection, especially for pharma-
ceutical product patents and regulatory data. These issues,
contested during the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS,
remain contentious, forming the subject of a series of trade
disputes within the WTO system. To a degree that is arguably
now in need of moderation, the discourse and analysis
surrounding TRIPS is dominated by coercion, the potential
for trade sanctions, and zero-sum calculations of interests. For
one discussion of an alternative approach (7). Furthermore, the
centrifugal inﬂuences on patent law have in fact led to the sole
amendment made to the wide-ranging package of trade
agreements administered by the WTO since they came into
force over a decade ago. An amendment to TRIPS has been
agreed, with the express goal of safeguarding access to
pharmaceuticals and preserving national ﬂexibilities; this was
preceded by a landmark political declaration by the world’s
trade ministers, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health (8).
The past decade has seen signiﬁcant growth in adherence to
optional, à la carte, elements of the international system, such
as the PCT. It has also seen increasingly diverse usage of the
system by inventors in and from developing countries and by
public sector institutions. This focus reﬂects both the increasing
capacity of leading developing countries in life sciences
innovation and conscious policy initiatives to capture beneﬁts
of public sector research. It also reﬂects the growth of public
sector investment in core areas of health, food, and agriculture.
In contrast to TRIPS, which is part of a single negotiated
package of agreements, individual nations elect whether or
not to adhere to the PCT. Recently, the trend in PCT
membership has shifted from an early preponderance of
developed economies or economies in transition towards
developing countries. The latter one now forms the majority
of the PCT members. There remains a considerable imbal-
ance in the usage of this system, with patent applicants from
the developed world predominating. Nonetheless, current
trends reveal double-digit growth, sustained over 5 years or
more, on the part of certain key developing countries. If
sustained, this trend will ultimately lead to a shift in the
center of mass of this aspect of the international patent
system (Fig. 1).
THE CORE ISSUES
The interplay between biomedical innovation and IP
raises complex questions, with roots deeply embedded in
many areas of public policy. Examples include the policy
formation and regulation concerning pharmaceuticals, food,
and agriculture; the ethics of reproductive technologies, stem
cell research, use of genetic resources, and the equitable
sharing of the ensuing beneﬁts; and the rights and interests of
indigenous and other traditional communities. It is inevitable
that such issues will ultimately be considered and resolved in
diverse ways across jurisdictions and cultural settings.
IP protection in this ﬁeld is not a recent consequence of
the emergence of modern biotechnology. Inventions in the
life sciences, such as Pasteur’s improved beer-making yeast
(9), were patented in the nineteenth century. In 1883, the
Paris Convention explicitly extended IP protection to agri-
cultural science and natural products (10). Yet, the recent
rapid surge in patents across the life sciences has led to a
renewed interest in several fundamental questions such as:
& Can a synthesized or extracted chemical compound
be considered patentably “novel” if it is chemically
identical to a compound that already exists in nature?
& When is a therapeutic compound or an isolated
nucleotide sequence a “mere discovery” versus a true
invention?
& When should the claimed invention in a patent
application be considered truly inventive, and when
is it merely obvious, a predictable or routine labora-
tory development, in the case of:
○ New polymorphs or salts?
○ The identiﬁcation of new therapeutic properties?
○ The development of a new dosage forms of known
pharmaceuticals?
& How do we resolve moral and bioethical issues
provoked by “patenting life”? When do these issues
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concern the technology itself, such as concerns over
stem cell research, and when do they concern the
grant or ownership of exclusive patent rights over
isolated chemical structures such as nucleotide
sequences? How should these exclusive rights be
exercised and to what ends?
& What is different about the new pharmaceutical from
a legal, regulatory, and ethical point of view? When
considering the chemistry of life, such as genes,
DNA, and the protein, they code for—are these to
be considered “just” a chemical compound or should
they be considered something more?
Established patent jurisdictions such as the USA and the
EPO/European Union continue to develop answers to these
questions (11). However, as use of the patent system
internationalizes and broadens in scope (geographically,
culturally, and across levels of economic development) and
as more diverse actors (such as public institutions or public–
private partnerships) develop an active stake, answers to
these questions may likewise evolve in more diverse ways,
posing challenges for the international patent system.
TWO PARADOXES
These issues can be reduced to two fundamental para-
doxes. The ﬁrst and central paradox of IP law is that it aims to
promote the production of public goods by creating exclusive
private rights, purposefully creating public beneﬁt by exclud-
ing material from the public domain. Patents legally entitle
their owners to exclude third parties from the use of the
claimed invention to create an incentive structure for the
development and implementation of a valuable invention and
to encourage disclosure to the public on how to carry out the
invention. The challenge is to set the right balance between
legitimate rights for the inventor and beneﬁcial access to
technology for the public.
Consider, for example, an invention of borderline
“inventiveness”. Would the public interest be better served
by refusing the patent and thereby consigning this innovation
to the public domain, free for others to use, leaving open
pathways for research and development using this innova-
tion? As expressed by the US Supreme Court: “It was never
the object of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every
triﬂing device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which
would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled
mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufac-
tures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges
tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates
a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to
watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its
foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them
to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the art” (12,
13, 14). Or would the public interest be better served by the
granting of property rights for that invention, creating an
incentive for investment in the development and actual
implementation of the technology? The US Supreme Court
again recalled that the economic philosophy behind patent
law is that “encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful
Arts.’”(15). Such borderline questions may need to be
resolved differently in diverse national jurisdictions. Never-
theless, there may also be broader policy interest in ensuring
a reasonable degree of consistency and convergence in
outcomes from different national systems.
The second paradox is that the patent system is, in
principle, neutral as to the ﬁeld of technology that is covered.
Yet, to maintain technology neutrality patent law applies a
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Fig. 1. Overall participation in the international patent system. PCT publications by nationality of applicant.
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range of technology-speciﬁc interventions. A basic premise of
patent law is that all ﬁelds of technology should be treated
consistently or without discrimination (16). However, main-
taining the optimal balance between public and private
interests in relation to biomedical patents has necessitated
the institution of speciﬁc measures that recognize the
particular characteristics of this ﬁeld of technology. In other
words, paradoxically, a technology-neutral approach requires
technology-speciﬁc interventions such as:
& Explicit rules on whether patents should be available
for speciﬁc areas of technology, such as newly
identiﬁed secondary therapeutic uses of known com-
pounds, or for bare nucleotide sequences without
clearly disclosed utility
& The morality and ordre public exceptions to patent-
able subject matter that potentially exclude inven-
tions such as genetically modiﬁed mammals
& The exceptions to the reach of patent rights (such as the
scope of research exceptions and the reach of patents
on the use of research tools such as DNA sequences)
& The interaction of the patent system with the
regulation of pharmaceuticals for safety and efﬁcacy,
for instance in linking entry of generic drugs to patent
enforcement
& Rules governing IP management in the public
interest for public-funded biomedical innovation
& Compulsory licensing and government use provisions
in the public health domain, especially the tailored
system for pharmaceutical patents established
through the Doha process (8)
& Forms of disclosure of technological information
uniquely required in the life sciences, notably the
deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent
procedure and speciﬁc mechanisms for disclosure of
DNA sequences. It is in this regard that a distinct
international system is established under the Buda-
pest Treaty for the mutual recognition of deposit of
microorganisms for patent purposes
& Proposals to require inventors who make use of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge to disclose source,
origin, and aspects of legal provenance, including
evidence of beneﬁt-sharing. This is argued to clarify
and strengthen the relationship between the TRIPS
agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and the protection of traditional knowledge—
increasingly present in national laws, and urged inter-
nationally by India, Brazil and other developing nations
(17).
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
IN CONTEXT
Getting the balance of interests right is of course most
critical in the public health area. This is why many countries
and TRIPS itself have special forms of intervention in this
area. TRIPS requires patents to be available under national
law for any legitimate inventions, without discrimination as to
place of invention, ﬁeld of technology, and whether the
invention is imported or locally produced (18). However, it is
permissible to exclude patents on inventions if their commer-
cial exploitation would jeopardize human, animal, or plant
life or health (19). TRIPS also allows (but does not require)
countries to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans from the scope of
inventions eligible for patenting (20) since some countries
assess the balance of interests differently for such inventions
than for other areas of technology.
International rules, in particular TRIPS, are most often
viewed as a constraint on national policymaking, as a
reduction of legislative choice, and as an enforced conver-
gence of national laws. For instance, as a result of TRIPS, it is
now mandatory to make patents available for pharmaceutical
products and for patent terms to run for at least 20 years. This
contrasts with the past autonomous policy choices of many
countries. The kind of earlier regulatory diversity that the
TRIPS negotiations reversed was documented at the time in
“Uruguay Round—Group of Negotiations on Goods—Nego-
tiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods—
Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally
Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection
of Intellectual Property” (21). International rules are also
viewed as a means of safeguarding regulatory diversity. Once
compliant with the international standards, countries have, in
principle, a free hand to exercise ﬂexibility within the policy
space deﬁned by these general international rules. The
pressure for ﬂexibility has been most acutely felt within the
area of pharmaceutical patents and the life sciences because
of the high levels of public interest.
This pressure came conspicuously to a head in 2001 when
concern about access to key antiretroviral drugs led WTO
Members to issue the Doha Declaration. This statement
captured the essence of the ﬁrst patent paradox, the contrast
between exclusive rights and access to technology: “IP
protection is important for the development of new medi-
cines…we recognize the concerns about its effects on prices.”
Equally, Doha formalized the concept of national policy
ﬂexibility to promote public health: “TRIPS does not and
should not prevent…taking measures to protect public health.
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to [TRIPS]…
[TRIPS] can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of…right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this
connection, we reafﬁrm the right…to use, to the full, the
provisions in [TRIPS], which provide ﬂexibility for this
purpose.”While the Doha process has concentrated on policy
options for compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents,
the domains of national legislative and policy ﬂexibility range
across a broader range of measures and policy players
(Table I; Fig. 2).
Despite the continuing political emphasis on centrifugal
dynamics and interests, there remains a strong policy and
public interest rationale for the international convergence of
national patent systems. In particular, greater administrative
and procedural cooperation on the international level will be
essential to enhance “patent quality” (i.e., the correlation
between patents granted and public interest). A vigorous
debate continues as to whether, and if so how, the interna-
tional harmonization of the substantive law of patentable
inventions would advance the attainment of patent quality. A
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centrifugal view on patent quality maintains that patentability
criteria and their practical application must be deﬁned and
exercised by sovereign nations in a fully independent manner,
consistent with the economic needs and policy priorities of
each country. Conversely, a centripetal view maintains that
sufﬁcient resources will never be available to allow the
practical realization of full practical independence and that
there are sufﬁcient shared interests to justify a common legal
basis for closer cooperation and worksharing.
Recalling that patents are independent and territorially
conﬁned to individual jurisdictions, the practical reality is that
most patents are ﬁled for essentially the same subject matter
in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, patent granting authorities are,
in parallel, undertaking a great deal of duplicated work. This
is occurring at a time when ofﬁces around the globe are
confronted with near-unmanageable workloads. The sheer
logic of this situation may encourage work sharing, mutual
recognition of search and examination, and pooling of search
and examination resources. Harmonization is inevitable, be it
promoted by legal platforms such as the draft Substantive
Patent Law Treaty or conducted through an ad hoc arrange-
ment between cooperating ofﬁces. In practice, ofﬁces pay
Table I. Pre- and Postgrant Fields of Flexibility in Patent Law and Practice
Form of ﬂexibility Examples
Pregrant
Legislative and administrative authorities Choice of what is and is not per se patentable Exclusions for higher life forms, morality
exceptions, medical treatments
Application of patentability criteria
(novelty, nonobviousness and utility)
to life sciences subject matter
Refusal of patents on gene sequences
without speciﬁc utility
Institutional and private actors Decision whether or not to seek a patent
on a given invention, and in whose name
Role of public sector institutions—
Bayh–Dole policies, university
IP policies
Postgrant
Role and obligations of patent holder Choice of how to exercise patents (see Fig. 2) Obligations to “work” the patent,
consequences of refusal to license;
options for humanitarian use,
“open source”, and other
nonexclusive licensing
Legislative and judicial authorities Determination scope or reach of patent rights:
what downstream actions does it encompass?
Exceptions for research activities,
“reach through” of claims on
applications of patented technology
Legislative and judicial authorities Choice of how to regulate the patent and behavior
by the patent owner, once granted
Compulsory licensing, government use
provisions; constraints on patent abuse
and anticompetitive behavior
Legislative and judicial authorities Choice of linkage of patent law to other forms
of regulation
Linkages with the regulatory approval
of pharmaceuticals
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attention to one another’s work, with some requiring the
submission of search and examination outcomes in other
jurisdictions.
The PCT already functions to reduce the administrative
burden of patent authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Legally,
the PCT forms a union of sovereign states, the International
Patent Cooperation Union, “for cooperation in the ﬁling,
searching, and examination, of applications for the protection
of inventions, and for rendering special technical services
(22).” It also provides a common international search and
examination process that yields a written opinion on the
patentability of the claimed invention before an application
enters national patenting procedures (23). The PCT provides
for a degree of cooperation and practical convergence,
without prejudice to substantive national law (24). The
increasing practical availability of these international search
and examination opinions and information about the entry of
international applications into the national phase provides an
unprecedented degree of transparency in the patenting
process (25).
TRIPS nominally harmonized patent law around the
three core patentability criteria: novelty, nonobviousness/
inventive step, and utility/industrial applicability (19). In so
doing, it documented the convergence of views on the kind of
exclusions from the public domain that would best advance
the public interest. In the Anglo-American legal tradition,
this utilitarian framework can be traced back to at least the
1623 Statue of Monopolies passed by the English Parliament
(26). However, TRIPS provided no guidance on substantive
legal questions raised by these general principles, such as the
range of background knowledge (“prior art”) considered
relevant in assessing novelty, how to assess when a claimed
invention is obvious to the relevant person skilled in the art,
and what test for utility is required. Thus, in setting an agreed
general standard that leaves substantive questions open,
TRIPS effectively permitted policy ﬂexibility. TRIPS also
explicitly provided certain areas of ﬂexibility on patentable
subjectmatter and a priori exclusions from patentability (20,21).
INTERNATIONAL LAWAND BIOPIRACY
Developments in the life sciences, notably the perception
that developed countries have vastly increased their capacity
to derive value and beneﬁt from genetic materials originating
in developing countries, have triggered an intense debate
over the equities of the patent system as currently conﬁgured.
This has led to calls to recalibrate the equitable balance
within the patent system and has reshaped the dynamics of
patent law and policy in the international arena. Most
strikingly at present, this has led to proposals to rewrite
international patent law standards making it mandatory to
disclose genetic resources and traditional knowledge used in
the course of developing an invention. In some formulations,
the obligation is extended to require evidence of the legal
circumstances of source or origin, with the requirement for
prior informed consent for its use of the indigenous materials.
National laws have also been amended along these lines
in a number of economies, creating a distinctive new
requirement for those seeking patent protection for life
sciences inventions. A divisive debate continues internation-
ally over the appropriate scope, if any, and effectiveness of
such disclosure requirements. Nevertheless, such practices are
emerging as a matter of national practice in a number of
jurisdictions. This issue exempliﬁes the centrifugal trend in
national responses to the two paradoxes of life sciences
patent policymaking, especially the question of how to
reconcile differential treatment of speciﬁc technological areas
with the broader goal of nondiscriminatory implementation of
the basic principles of patent law.
NATURAL MATERIALS: DEFINING INNOVATION
One consistent concern with life science patenting has
been the legitimacy of patents on “naturally occurring”
materials: in other words, on newly identiﬁed or character-
ized, isolated, puriﬁed, or synthesized chemical forms that
correspond to those already existing in nature. Contemporary
concerns over patenting of gene sequences are but a new
chapter in a long-running debate. In the early years of last
century, beriberi was a major cause of death in Asia. Suzuki
discovered that a substance in rice bran (aberic acid, later
called thiamin or vitamin B1) prevented the disease. This was
the ﬁrst vitamin to be isolated, and in 1911, it received
Japanese patent 20785. Similarly, within the USA, a landmark
case concerned adrenalin, which was ﬁrst isolated for possible
therapeutic use by Takamine. A patent on isolated adrenalin
was upheld because its isolation was considered to be novel
and of therapeutic relevance. Judge Learned Hand concluded
that “even if it were merely an extracted product without
change, there is no rule that such products are not patentable.
Takamine was the ﬁrst to make [adrenaline] available for any
use by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it was
found, and, while it is of course possible logically to call this a
puriﬁcation of the principle, it became for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That
was a good ground for a patent” (27). Thus, a distinction
emerged between a patent on a naturally occurring com-
pound versus its artiﬁcially extracted and isolated form, for
which speciﬁc utility has been identiﬁed. Plainly, a patent
claim for adrenalin in its natural state, within the human
suprarenal gland, would be invalid.
The same general issue confronts the patent examiner
today: when a naturally occurring nucleotide sequence
legitimately be viewed as an invention versus a simple
discovery of the workings of nature? Despite the centrifugal
trend in debate, there is a degree of practical convergence on
this question between different patent ofﬁces, pivoting on the
very understanding highlighted by Justice Hand: i.e., that the
isolation of a gene sequence must deliver a new state of
affairs of practical utility to humanity, not simply the
discovery that a certain nucleotide sequence exists in nature
(28). For instance, European law provides that “[a]n element
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by
means of a technical process, including the sequence or
partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable
invention, even if the structure of that element is identical
to that of a natural element” (29). Yet a patent is awarded for
an invention, not for a bare chemical structure per se, even if
it is newly disclosed. Therefore, there must be clear, practical
utility associated with the newly identiﬁed or isolated gene
sequence. For this reason, within the EU, a bare nucleic acid
sequence is not patentable without its function being indicat-
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ed. If a gene sequence is used to produce a protein, the
protein and its function must be identiﬁed. If the nucleotide
sequence has a different function, such as transcription
promoter activity, that should likewise be indicated. Similarly,
in 2001, the US Patent Ofﬁce issued Utility Examination
Guidelines that requires a patent on an isolated gene to
demonstrate “speciﬁc, substantial, and credible” utility (30).
Particularly in developing countries such as Brazil, China, and
India, there is an emerging global practice of allowing patents
on gene sequences, provided that the disclosed sequences
meet the criteria of being truly inventive and practically
useful for a deﬁned purpose, rather than being simply an
observation. This idea is built into the very concept of
“invention” in many jurisdictions, where it is conceived as a
speciﬁed solution to a technical problem, and not as a
scientiﬁc insight (31).
One continuing point of diversity in national legislative
approaches is for a priori exclusions of certain subject matter.
Debate continues over new chemical structures, derivatives,
or “follow on” innovations in the pharmaceutical sector.
Questions include the conditions under which the following
are legitimate inventions as opposed to a routine adaptation
of known technology, including:
& Puriﬁed or newly isolated substances
& New formulations and combinations of known compounds
& New therapeutic applications of “selection” patents
within a known range, or species of compounds
within a known genus
& New dosage forms or regimens
& New delivery routes, new salts and esters, poly-
morphs, and metabolites
Typically, in established patent systems, such claimed
inventions have been assessed case by case, in the light of the
technological background. A relatively recent trend has been
to specify a priori rules in patent legislation, ruling out certain
classes of pharmaceuticals. The Andean Community Decision
486 rules out new patents for new uses of products or
processes that are already patented (32). India’s patent law
was amended in 2005 to rule out “the mere discovery of a
new form of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efﬁcacy of that substance or the
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known
substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product
or employs at least one new reactant” (33). An explanatory
note clariﬁes that “For the purposes of this clause, salts,
esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle
size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations
and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered
to be the same substance, unless they differ signiﬁcantly in
properties with regard to efﬁcacy.” A technology-speciﬁc
intervention was made in the USA, when the patent code was
amended in 1995 to create a presumption that any biotech-
nological process which yields a nonobvious product is itself
nonobvious (34).
Much commentary in international debate casts skepti-
cism over the legitimacy of patents on follow-on innovations
such as new forms of known compounds. Some studies have
cast doubt on the therapeutic value of such new drugs. Yet, a
WHO-commissioned report points out that: “[i]ncremental
innovation can play an important part in the development of
improved products that address public health needs. For
instance, improving safety, simplifying the delivery of a drug
or vaccine, or improving the efﬁciency with which it can be
manufactured, can have an important impact on clinical
outcomes or affordability and acceptability. Many of the
modiﬁcations needed to align existing interventions more
closely with the needs of poorer populations are likely to be
of the incremental variety” (35). To resolve competing
objectives—promoting valuable incremental innovation,
while not burdening the public with exclusive rights over
trivial adaptations—policymakers confront a dilemma: wheth-
er to legislate technology-speciﬁc a priori rules on patentabil-
ity or to rely on the continuous practical review and
refreshment of broad patent principles as patent ofﬁces and
courts assess claimed inventions against the evolving techno-
logical background, as in the life sciences what is “obvious”
today may have been highly inventive 12 months ago.
In addition, questions of public expectation, moral issues,
and public well-being result in regional differences in
patentability decisions. Some jurisdictions categorize certain
technologies as being inherently contrary to morality, such as
the European ban on patents for inventions involving the
modiﬁcation of human genetic identity, human cloning,
commercial exploitation of embryos, or the modiﬁcation of
animals’ genetic identity to cause them suffering while
yielding no substantial medical beneﬁt (36). The public
interest is typically considered on a case-by-case basis in
assessing morality and public well-being. For example, in
China, a patent may still be available if an invention has
positive therapeutic properties, despite being potentially
detrimental due to undesirable side effects or the potential
for abuse of the technology.
The EPO Howard Florey/Relaxin case (37) provides an
exemplary overview of the points raised in this “morality”
debate and highlights how established general principles are
applied to valuable, but potentially controversial, new tech-
nologies. It concerned a European patent (38) ﬁled in 1983,
granted in 1991, and opposed by a coalition of green
members of the European Parliament. The case was appealed
and only ﬁnally decided in 2002. The patent was for a
synthesized DNA sequence that coded for a human H2-
preprorelaxin, functionally equivalent to naturally occurring
H2-relaxin. It was derived from human tissue obtained, with
consent, during childbirth. It enabled the production, through
novel nonhuman biological processes, of clinical quantities of
relaxin for therapeutic use. In its natural form, it was difﬁcult
to obtain in sufﬁcient quantities for therapeutic use or even
systematic investigation. In effect it had to be harvested (with
the prior informed consent of human subjects) from the
minute quantities of relaxin naturally produced within the
human body. It was practically undesirable and technically
not feasible to continue to obtain human relaxin produced by
human physiology, creating a technical problem for research-
ers hoping to explore its therapeutic potential. Accordingly,
the availability of recombinant, synthetic relaxin was, in
Justice Hand’s phrase from the Adrenaline case, “for every
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeuti-
cally (30).”
This hormone is structurally related to insulin, which led
to certain false assumptions about its structure. This meant
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that the eventual derivation of its sequence with a deﬁned
function contradicted general expectations about its charac-
teristics, reinforcing the claim that this invention was not
obvious in the terms of patent law. It was ﬁrst investigated for
its role in loosening the pelvic ligaments and ripening the
cervix prior to childbirth, with potential application in
treating difﬁcult births. This line of investigation failed when
problems arose in ﬁnding a stable and effective means of
delivery. Relaxin was subsequently tested as a potential
treatment for ﬁbrosis, and scleroderma in particular (39).
Even though relaxin existed in nature, the availability of
greater quantities of recombinant relaxin produced instead by
bacteria meant the isolated sequence was potentially a
patentable invention, illustrated how in the life sciences what
“occurs in nature” can yet be a genuine invention (27). The
very point of the invention was to create a nonhuman means
of producing the hormone relaxin—despite earlier misleading
scientiﬁc analyses, based on apparent similarities with insulin.
It transpired that human relaxin (or more strictly two distinct
forms of the hormone) were signiﬁcantly different than that
derived from other mammalian species. For example, porcine
relaxin was therapeutically useless for humans. The essence
of the invention was creating the capability of producing
cloned human relaxin through genetically modiﬁed bacteria.
The objective of the invention was to avoid harvesting relaxin
from the human body but rather to produce it through the
cloning of unicellular hosts. Accordingly, humans were not
the source of the recombinant relaxin. Thus, the patent case
turned, legally and technologically, on the transfer of a
distinctively human gene sequence from consenting human
subjects to single-cell bacteria—violating, in a literal sense at
least, the “integrity” of the human genome and conferring a
distinctively human trait on a markedly distinct organism.
Given the positive ethical aspect of the search for
treatments for human ailments, decision makers have been
reluctant to rule out such inventions on the basis of moral
objections. Considering the opposition, the EPO observed
that “to ﬁnd a substance freely occurring in nature is a mere
discovery and therefore unpatentable. However, if a sub-
stance found in nature has ﬁrst to be isolated from its
surroundings and a process for obtaining it is developed, that
process is patentable. Moreover, if this substance can
properly be characterised by its structure and it is new in
the absolute sense of having no previously recognised
existence, then the substance per se may be patentable” (40).
The EPO decision reviewed a wide range of grounds of
opposition at the level of basic principle in a manner that
provides a comprehensive insight into the interplay between
law and policy in this ﬁeld. The opponents charged that the
patent was not novel, since as the gene encoding relaxin had
always been present in human body. Nevertheless, it was held
that even naturally occurring substances isolated for the ﬁrst
time with no previously recognized existence were patent-
able. Against the claim that the patent had no inventive step
or was obvious, since conventional techniques had been used
to isolate the gene sequence, it was held that the very
existence of the substance in the form disclosed was a
surprise and confounded expectations about the nature of
relaxin. The method alone used to achieve the invention was
not enough to determine obviousness. The opponents likened
the claimed invention to a “mere discovery” such as patenting
the moon or a new animal found in a remote area. The
Opposition Division agreed that it was a substance freely
occurring in nature, and would not be patentable, but took
the view that it was not a mere discovery to newly isolate and
characterize a substance. A further distinction was that the
invention was a solution to an established technical problem
(creating therapeutic supplies of relaxin). On the question of
whether the invention was contrary to morality and whether
it was indeed an offense to human dignity (by isolating a gene
from tissue and by using pregnancy for a technical, proﬁt-
oriented process), the decision held that the general public
would not view the invention as too abhorrent for a patent to
be granted. However, it was required that the tissue had been
donated with consent within framework of gynecological
operations. Bioethics standards have previously been consis-
tent with the approval of using human body parts, removed
during an intervention, for medical purposes, and any life-
saving substances had been isolated in this manner.
Against the claims that patenting human genes amounted
to a form of “modern slavery” (entailing dismemberment of
women and their piecemeal sale to commercial enterprises)
and that patenting human genes amounted to the intrinsically
immoral patenting of human life, the ﬁnal decision took the
view that there was no slavery: a patent on DNA encoding H2
relaxin does not create rights over individual human beings,
and the invention achieved the opposite of dismemberment. To
the contrary, the whole point—the technical problem solved—
was to avoid harvesting relaxin from the human body and
instead to produce it through cloning the unicellular hosts.
Patenting a “human gene has nothing to do with the patenting
of human life,” and there was no moral distinction discerned
between patenting a gene and other substances found in the
human body, such as adrenaline. The reasoning in the decision
may or may not attract the approval of all commentators, but it
certainly set out the kind of key distinctions that need to be
weighed in assessing the patentability of such inventions. A
further review of these issues in can be found in the Australian
Law Reform Commission, Issues Paper on Gene Patenting and
Human Health, 2003 (41), which cites the examples of Claes
(42), Schrecker et al. (43), and Keays (44).
The following table sets out the key points of opposition
and the responses made by the EPO in its decision, to provide
an accessible overview of how patent law in one leading
jurisdiction works through such issues (Table II).
CONCLUSIONS
TRIPS has induced considerable convergence in patent
law, removing key exceptions to patentable subject matter
(notably mandating patents on pharmaceutical products) and
precluding discrimination between technologies in patent law.
Yet, as illustrated by the range of technology-speciﬁc measures
in patent law, life sciences innovation is not “just another” ﬁeld
of technology. Ensuring that the widely accepted general
principles of the patent system are effectively applied in the
life sciences necessitated speciﬁc regulatory interventions. On
the other hand, human engineered “natural” products have
been developed and patented for well over a century. Modern
biotechnology and pharmaceutical science do not necessarily
bring wholly new and distinct challenges for the patent system.
However, at a time when life sciences policymakers must
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respond both to hope for new technologies for human health
and to concern about equitable access to the beneﬁts of new
technologies, continuing speciﬁc attention will be made to the
life sciences. Considerations will be based upon distinctive
social and economic factors associated with these technologies,
including:
& The ethical concerns associated with biotechnology as
such and separate ethical questions about extending
patents to biotechnology subject matter (such as gene
sequences and higher life forms)
& The importance of the pharmaceutical technologies
for meeting the fundamental human needs
& The strong north–south dimension both of research
priorities and access to and transfer of technology
& The relatively high proportion of public funds
invested in life sciences research, with concomitant
public expectations of enhanced welfare outcomes
& Questions of ownership, control, and consent of
genetic resources when used in biomedical innova-
tion, be they derived from human agricultural or
other biological sources
Such considerations lead to distinct regulatory interven-
tions with bearing on patents in the life sciences, including:
& Speciﬁc restrictions on patentable subject matter,
such as methods of medical treatment or essentially
biological processes (16)
& Amendments to TRIPS to facilitate compulsory
licensing for pharmaceutical products, for those
countries with limited manufacturing capacity
& The Budapest system for deposit of microorganisms
for patent purposes
& Mechanisms for disclosure of origin or consent for
genetic resources and traditional knowledge
& Speciﬁc morality-based exclusions from patentability
The broad principles of patent law represent a steady
accumulation of understanding how to resolve the ﬁrst
paradox, by ensuring that patents are available only for
genuine inventions that are of practical utility and that are
fully disclosed to the public. These principles have been
repeatedly tested in the context of controversial life sciences
technologies and have been shown to be surprisingly resilient
and appropriate.
Patenting activities in the life sciences will continue to be
subject to particular scrutiny and public concern because they
represent the tip of the iceberg of technological development
in ﬁelds that are of enormous public importance. Concerns
about setting the appropriate bounds of exclusive rights over
life sciences technologies will continue to arise as new
technologies work their way through the patent system.
Speciﬁc legislative interventions may be required to ensure
that the patent system remains true to its core principles.
Paradoxically, the characteristics of life sciences innovation
mean that differential treatment of patent law principles may
be necessary to ensure nondiscriminatory impact in practice.
Sustaining the patent system as a public policy tool for
socially beneﬁcial impact is a continuing challenge but one
with profound importance for developed and developing
countries alike.
It is not a minor task to adapt and apply these general
principles to speciﬁc cases in the face of overlapping concerns
impacted by international law, scientiﬁc and technological
developments, and social and economic issues. This challenge
is further magniﬁed by an increasingly diverse array of countries
that take an active role in the use of patent mechanisms to
capture the beneﬁts of life sciences innovation. Above all else,
the development of an overarching, international standard for
the application of patent law principles poses a dynamic
Table II. Core Patentability Issues in the Relaxin Case
Opponents argument EPO decision
Not novel, as the gene-encoding relaxin
had always been present in human body
Novel: natural substances isolated for the ﬁrst time with
no previously recognized existence were patentable
No inventive step (i.e., obvious)—
a conventional method had been
used to isolate the DNA
Inventive. The very existence of the substance in the
form disclosed was a surprise, confounding expectations.
Method used to obtain it not signiﬁcant in assessing obviousness
Mere discoveries are not patentable.
Cannot patent the moon or a new
animal found in a remote area
Mere discovery to ﬁnd a substance freely occurring in nature:
not patentable. But it is not a mere discovery to newly isolate
and characterize a substance. The moon and animals are not novel;
not solutions to technical problems
Invention was contrary to morality
or ordre public
General public would not view the invention as too abhorrent
for a patent to be granted
Isolating a gene from tissue taken from a
pregnant woman an offense to human
dignity: pregnancy is used for a
technical proﬁt-oriented process
Tissue was donated with consent within framework of gynecological
operations; many life-saving substances isolated in this way,
patented, and welcomed by the public; bioethics norms
approve use for other purposes of parts of the human body
removed during an intervention
Patenting human genes amounts to a form
of modern slavery: it involves
dismemberment of women and their
piecemeal sale to commercial enterprises
No slavery—a patent covering DNA encoding H2 relaxin does not
confer any rights to individual human beings. No dismemberment—
the whole point is to avoid harvesting relaxin from the human body,
producing it through cloning unicellular hosts. Humans are not the source
Patenting human genes means that human
life is patented. This is intrinsically immoral
Patenting a “human gene has nothing to do with the patenting of human life.”
No moral distinction can be seen between the patenting of genes and
other important human substances (e.g., adrenaline)
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challenge for policymakers as they balance the necessary
regulatory diversity with a continuing core conception of the
public interest. Rapid technological advances create mean that
technical criteria for patent eligibility, such as what is “obvious”
to a skilled expert outpace the regular tempo of legislative
reform and responses. The fundamental logic and the essential
principles of patent law retain broad acceptance, but wrangling
will inevitably continue over how these principles should be
adapted for new technologies. Historically, much of the
practical content of patent law has been shaped through
adversarial court cases, and national and international law is
generally restricted to expressing broadly adaptable principles.
But a signiﬁcant recent development has seen increasing desire
on the part of legislators to react to technologically-speciﬁc
concerns, especially in the life sciences, through technologically
speciﬁc interventions, in the hope of ensuring the patent system
remains an effective, balanced instrument of public policy. Yet
much of the actual economic impact of the patent system arises
from choices about how patent rights, once granted, are
actually exercised in the ﬁeld—with the growing trend towards
public institutions and innovators in the developing world to
take out patents in the life sciences—much of the economic and
social impact of the system will result from their choices, as
much as from formal legislative structures.
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